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EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN INDIANA
By

CORBETT MCCLELLAN*

I
Quite frequently the jury renders a startling verdict. The average
individual cannot perceive why a sum of such magnitude can be recovered
when the actual injury suffered appears to be so trifling. The answer to
this mystery is solved when we find that the jury, in many instances, allows
a large amount as exemplary damages. For this reason, the writer has
been interested in the doctrine of exemplary damages. Furthermore, this
interest has been augmented by the peculiar theory of this kind of damage.
While it is not the purpose of this short article to- attempt a complete
analysis of the entire field of exemplary damages, an effOrt will be- made
to cover the general principles in this anomalous doctrine of our substantive
law, and to compare the position of our Indiana courts with the prevailing
views of other jurisdictions. 1 Moreover, it is not the intent of the writer
to indulge in any lengthy discussions regarding some of the controverted
points involved in this topic because that phase of the subject has been
thoroughly handled by several of our most eminent text book writers.
II
Stated as a general rule, motive is immaterial in the law of damages
and full compensation may be recovered although the wrong was not inflicted
intentionally or with any culpable purpose. Or, in other words, if a wrong
has been committed, the jury may award the injured party indemnity for
his losses without any inquiry as to the wrongdoer's frame of mind or
method of inflicting the injury. However, when a question of exemplary
damages arises, the mental state of the defendant, and the method used
in causing the injury become highly important factors. Exemplary damages
have been defined as damages given to an injured party when a tort is
accompanied by malice, oppressiveness, fraud, or reckless disregard of
the rights of others on the part of the wrongdoer.2 Many of the courts
call these damages punitive damages; in fact the terms are often used interchangeably. 3 While a few courts, at one time, attempted to distinguish
between the two, it seems well settled now that they mean the same thing.
* Of the Muncie Bar.
1 The writer is indebted to Professor Hugh E. Willis, of the Indiana University
Law School faculty, for many helpful suggestions.
2 Citizens Street Ry. Co. v. Willoely, 134 Ind. 563; State v. Stevens, 103 Ind. 55.
3 State v. Stevens, ibid.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

others calling them "vindicative" damages and sometimes
You will also find
"smart money."'4 As a general proposition, they are confined solely to tort
actions, although there are a few exceptions to this rule which will be
discussed later.
III

A brief examination of the authorities divulges that there are two
principal theories of exemplary damages. One line of cases hold that
they are given as a warning to other wrongdoers, and as a punishment
to the defendant. 5 Or, in other words, they are more in the nature of a
penalty, given in addition to the compensatory damages. This theory is
unquestionably followed by the majority of the courts. The other view
is that these damages are compensatory in nature, the theory apparently
being that the bad motive and conduct of the wrongdoer increases the
actual damage suffered. 6 For the most part this is the viewpoint championed
by Professor Greenleaf. His argument was that damages should always
be precisely commensurate with the injury, but that the wilfulness of the
defendant's conduct should always be shown so that the jury might include
in their assessment of damages the mental agony, indignity, and so forth
suffered by the plaintiff. 7 Indiana is definitely aligned with the majority
view. In State v. Stevens, the Court says:
"Exemplary or punitive damages are damages allowed as a punishment,
or by way of example, to deter others from the like offenses, for torts
committed with accompanying fraud, malice, or oppression." s

IV
Whenever a tort is accompanied by circumstances of aggravation, the
majority of jurisdictions allow the recovery of exemplary damages. The
doctrine seems to have made its appearance in England in the famous
case of Huckle v. Money, 9 and has been adopted in practically all of our
states as a part of the common law. However, there are a few jurisdictions
which deny their recovery altogether. 10 In these jurisdictions, it is argued,
that as a matter of logic, the whole doctrine is unsound. And it is submitted
that when viewed from this standpoint alone, their reasoning is quite convincing. For instance, they point out that the whole theory of damages is
that of compensation to the injured person, and that it is illogical and senseless to allow as damages any amount beyond reparation to the injured. Also
they reason that it is unfair to the defendant to leave the matter of punishment solely in the bands of the jury. This last argument, however, doesn't
carry much weight because all damages in a tort action if the injuries are
non-pecuniary are, for the most part, left in the uncontrolled hands of the
jury. This situation is exemplified in Indiana as the courts have been very
4 Farman v. Lauman, 73 Ind. 568.

5 Cady v. Case, 45 Kan. 733, 26 Pac. 448; Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 14
L. ed. 181; Phila. Traction Co. v. Orbann, 119 Pa. 37, 12 Atl. 816; Bergmann v. Jones,
94 N. Y. 51; see also Sedgwick on Damages (9th Ed.), Vol. 1, Sec. 360.
6 Stevens v. Friedman, 58 W. Va. 78. 51 S. E. 132; Quigley v. Central Ry., 11
Nev. 350; Union Pacific Ry. v. House, 1 Wyo. 27.
7 Vol. 2, Greenleaf, Evidence (16th Ed.), Secs. 266 and 267.
8 103 Ind. 55.

9 2 Wills 205, 95 Eng. Reprint 768.

10 Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342; Woodhouse v. Powles, 43 Wash. 617, 86 Pac.

1063; Bee Publishing Co. v. World Publishing Co., 59 Neb. 713, 82 N. W. 28;
Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541; Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238,
28 N. E. 1.
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Further,
reluctant to reverse a verdict because of excessive damages. 1
the latter argument is weak in that it presupposes that a jury is not as
competent to inflict punishment as is the legislature. Although these few
states refuse to sanction the doctrine of exemplary damages, there is at
least one of them which allows the motive of a tort to be shown as tending
to prove mental suffering. 12 It is submitted that as a practical result, the
award in such a case may be as large as if "exemplary damages themselves
were allowed.
There are also a few states which allow the recovery of exemplary
damages which are in fact compensatory. 13 That is, the damages, which
they call exemplary, are those sometimes called non-pecuniary in character,
such as damages for pain, mental suffering, and loss of reputation.
Indiana has always followed the common law rule with reference
to
14
this type of damage, subject to the conditions to be discussed later.
V
(a)

Not Recoverable Without Actual Loss

While the majority of the courts allow exemplary damages, the almost
universal rule seems to be that the plaintiff must suffer some actual injury
before he is entitled to recover them. 1 In other words, an individual can't
maintain an action simply to inflict punishment. This rule is obviously
sound because bad motive, in itself, does not constitute a cause of action.
There must be a legal wrong committed before a person is entitled to any
kind of damages. However, it is difficult to understand why an award of
nominal damages will not justify the allowance of an additional amount as
exemplary damages if the plaintiff's right has been invaded in a vicious
manner. The theory of exemplary damages is punishment. Why should it
make any difference whether a substantial or trivial injury was suffered
if the purpose of their allowance is to punish the offender for his bad motive?
A right has been invaded and therefore the fact that no serious injury
resulted should be immaterial. The tendency of such conduct is that
serious injury usually results, and the mere fact that it didn't so happen in
a particular case seems unimportant. Of course, if the theory is that such
damages are given as additional compensation, the result is clearly sound,
but as has been pointed out, this is not the theory in most jurisdictions. In
this connection it is important to notice that a few states sanction their
recovery where nominal damages only are shown. 16 The writer has been
unable to find any Indiana cases touching this point.
12 Hawes v. Knowles, 114 Mass. 518. In this case Chief Justice Gray said, "In
an action of tort for a wilful injury to the person, the manner and manifest motive
of the wrongful act may be given in evidence as affecting the question of damages;
for when the merely physical injury is the same, it may be more aggravated in its
effect upon the mind if it is done in wanton disregard of the rights and feelings of
the plaintiff, than if it is the result of mere carelessness."
13 Vol. I, Sedgwick, Damages (9th Ed.), Sec. 359.
14 Farman v. Lauman, 73 Ind. 568; Indianapolis Bleaching Co. v. McMillan, 64
Ind. App. 268.
15 Hanewacker v. Ferman, 152 Ill. 321, 38 N. E. 924; K-uhn v. Chicago, etc., Ry.
Co., 74 Iowa 137, 37 N. W. 116; Schippel v. Norton, 38 Kan. 567, 16 Pac. 804;
Maxwell v. Kennedy, 50 Wis. 648, 7 N. W. 657; McConathy v. Deck, 34 Colo. 461,
83 Pac. 135, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 358.
16 Doster v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 77 S. C. 56, 57 S. E. 671; Prince v.
Brooklyn Dailey Eagle, 37 N. Y. S. 250; Wilson v. Vaughn, 23 Fed. 229; Upchurch
v. Robertson, 127 N. C. 127, 37 S. E. 157.
11 Chgo. I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Stierwalt, 87 Ind. App. 478; City of Columbus v.
Allen, 40 Ind. App. 257.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

(b)

Circumstances of Aggravation a Prerequisite

As has been heretofore mentioned, this type of damage is usually given
where a tort is accompanied by the elements of malice, wilfulness, fraud,
or oppression. The basis of their allowance rests upon some fact of
aggravation, and if none exists, they cannot be recovered. A concrete
example of this is found in the Indiana case of Moore v. Cross.' 7 In that
case, recovery was sought for an alleged trespass. It appeared from the
evidence that the defendant honestly believed he had a legal right to commit
the wrong. For this reason, the court held that the plaintiff was restricted
to compensatory damages. However, malice, as used here, doesn't mean
actual hatred towards the wrongdoer; it simply means a deliberate intention
to do a wrong without any justification or legal excuse.' 8 So also, fraud,
as used in this connection, doesn't mean that an actual intent to deceive
must be shown; if the representations are in fact false, and made with
utter disregard of facts ascertainable by the use of due care, it is sufficient. 19
When the tort complained of is simply negligence on the part of the
defendant, exemplary damages cannot be recovered.20 The reason for
this is obvious. It is the element of wilfulness or wantonness for which
the law inflicts punishment, and since in the tort of negligence these elements
are lacking, recovery is denied. However, in many opinions, it is often
said, that if the defendant is guilty of "gross" negligence towards the
plaintiff, he may recover exemplary damages. 21 But here the language of
the courts is confusing. As far as actual damage is concerned, it is immaterial what kind of negligence it is; if a person is negligent in any degree, he
is liable for actual damages. In fact, the modern tendency is to abolish
all degrees of negligence. What then do the courts mean when then they
use the term "gross negligence"? A careful analysis of the opinions in
which the term is used clearly shows that it is not used to describe negligence
at all. What it actually means is that type of conduct generally known as
"utter disregard for the rights of others." In tort law, this kind of conduct
is something more than negligence although it does not mean the same
thing as an intentional wrong. It is similar to intentional conduct, however,
in that contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff does not preclude
him from recovering. It is frequently described as wantonness. In Indiana,
however, an allegation of gross negligence would not entitle the injured
person to recover exemplary damages. This position is taken by the court
in the case of Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Ry. Co. v. Shanks. 22 In
that case, the tort complained of was negligence on the part of the defendant
in overloading a truck, causing the truck to fall upon the plaintiff. The
lower court instructed the jury that if the defendant were guilty of gross
negligence the contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff would
not bar recovery. The Supreme Court held that the instruction was
erroneous, saying that in this class of cases there are no degrees of negligence
and that gross negligence is no more than mere negligence. A second
instruction told the jury that they might add exemplary damages in addition
43 Ind. 30.
Vol. II, Sutherland, Damages (3rd Ed.), Sec. 394.
19 Wheatcraft v. Myers, 57 Ind. App. 371, 107 N. E. 81.
20 Spencer v. San Francisco Brick Co., 4 Cal. App. 265, 89 Pac. 851; Chicago v.
Martin, 49 Ill. 241; Birmingham Ry. L. & P. Co. v. Wise, 149 Ala. 492, 42 So. 821.
See also 8 R. C. L., Sec. 133.
21 U. S. v. Taylor, 35 Fed. 484; Linsley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. 225; Ry. v. Roberts,
88 Miss. 80, 40 So. 481; Caldwell v. N. J. S. B. Co., 47 N. Y. 282; Keystone L. & I.
Co. v. McGrath, 21 So. 301.
22 94 Ind. 598.
17

18
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to the compensatory damages. This instruction was also held erroneous,
the court saying that wilfulness is not charged nor shown by the evidence
and that for mere negligence, compensatory damages only, are allowable.
Thus our court does not ascribe to the term, gross negligence, the meaning
many do when discussing liability for exemplary damages.
(c)

Legal Wrongs for Which They Are Recoverable

Exemplary damages are usually only recoverable in actions of tort and
consequently motive is immaterial when the wrong complained of is breach
of contract. 23 The reason for their denial in a contract action is not
altogether clear. A breach of contract is a wrong as much as a tort. If
the purpose of exemplary damages is to prevent and punish, why wouldn't
the doctrine be equally applicable in contract cases? Of course, this is true;
in a tort action, while motive doesn't make a wrong more wrongful, it often
may make the consequences more serious, whereas the loss occasioned by
breach of contract would seem to be the same in most cases, regardless of
motive. So also, if we adopt 1M1r. Sedgwick's theory as to the origin of
exemplary damages, the question can be solved. In the learned author's
treatise on the law of damages, he shows that originally the jury had
arbitrary power in determining damages. He further shows that this
unlimited power was gradually curbed, and that by the end of the eighteenth
century the present law as to the measure of damages in contract was
established. However, in cases of tort, this arbitrary power still remained,
and from it the doctrine of exemplary damages has originated. 24 Thus,
with the doctrine growing out of tort damages only, it is clear that none
can be recovered in a contract action. There is, however, one well recognized exception to the rule as to contract, viz., that of breach of contract
of marriage. Practically all jurisdictions allow an assessment of exemplary
damages in this type of case. 25

In this case, though, the exception is more

apparent than real for the simple reason that a breach of promise action is
in many respects more like a tort action than a contract action. 26
(d)

Where the Tort Is Also a Crime

The fact that the wrong committed is also punishable as a crime, is
immaterial according to the majority of the courts, and exemplary damages
may be recovered in such a case. 27 However, there is a small minority
which adheres to the view that if the tort is also a crime, there can be no
recovery for these damages. 28 The chief argument of the majority is that
the criminal prosecution is to redress the grievance of the public, while the
civil remedy is for private redress. The minority, on the other hand, point
23 Secs. 98, 99, Sutherland.
24
25

Vol. I, Sedgwick, Damages (9th Ed.), Sec. 349.

Kurtz v. Frank, 76 Ind. 594. See also 9 C. J. 381.

26 The whole doctrine of damages in a breach of promise suit is peculiar.

For
instance, damages for mental suffering may be recovered. This type of damage is
generally confined to tort actions. So evidence of an offer to remarry, after breach,
is admissible in mitigation of damages. And ill motive, on the part of the defendant,
as shown by pleadings, may increase the damages.
27 Roach v. Caldbeck, 64 Vt. 593, 24 Atl. 989; Bundy v. Maginess. 76 Cal. 532,
18 Pac. 668; Boetcher v. Staples, 27 Minn. 308. 7 N. W. 263; Brown v. Evans, 17 Fed.
912; Roberts v. Mason, 10 Ohio St. 277; Jackson v. Wells, 13 Texas Civ. App. 275,
35 S. W. 528; Smith v. Bagwell, 19 Fla. 117, 45 Am. Rep. 12; Chiles v. Drake, 2 Met.
(Ky.) 146, 74 Am. Dec. 406; Brown v. Evans, (U. S.) 8 Sawy. 488; Cook v. Ellios,
6 Hill (N. Y.) 466.
28 Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541; Cherry v. McCall, 23 Ga. 193.
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out that exemplary damages only commence at the point where full private
or compensatory damages end, and that an allowance in such a case would
result in double punishment for the defendant.
Indiana, at an early date, adopted the rule of the minority, and subsequent cases have clearly established the rule. 29 The argument of the
Indiana courts is the same as that of the others following this rule, that is,
that such a recovery would subject the offender to double punishment. In
the earliest Indiana case, that of Taber v. Huston, 30 it is said, "Taber may
be twice punished for the same assault and battery. This would not accord
with the spirit of our institutions. The Constitution declares that 'no
person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense,' and though that
provision may not relate to the remedies secured by civil proceedings, still
it serves to illustrate a fundamental principle incalculated by every wellregulated system of government, viz., that each violation of the law should
be certainly followed by one appropriate punishment and no more."
It will be noticed from the part of the opinion quoted above that the
court didn't expressly hold that such would be unconstitutional. It went no
further than to decide that such was contrary to the "spirit" of the Constitution. However, in the subsequent case of Koerner v. Oberly,31 the
court is more explicit. Involved in that case was the validity of a statute
permitting a wife to recover exemplary damages in a civil action against
one selling intoxicating liquors to her husband. This conduct on the part
of the vendor had previously been made a crime by the legislature. The
court, in the course of its opinion, expressly decided that the provision as
to exemplary damages was unconstitutional as it violated the fundamental
principle embodied in the "Bill of Rights," that no person shall be put in
jeopardy twice for the same offense.
In the later case, that of State v. Stevens, 32 the same line of reasoning
is followed. In this case, the validity of a statute as to illegal fees charged
or taken by an officer was involved. The statute, in question, in addition
to making it a misdemeanor for an officer to charge, demand, or take an
illegal fee, provided that he be liable on his official bond to the party injured
for five times the illegal fee. The court discusses at length the Koerner
case, and definitely affirms the reasoning of that case. However, in this
case, the legislation was upheld on the theory that the so-called penalty was
in fact compensatory in nature. The fact that the damages were definite
seems to have been the chief reason for the ultimate conclusion. For this
reason, the result seems inconclusive as the actual damage would appear
to be the amount of the illegal fee charged. Or in other words, part of
the damages provided for were actually in the nature of punishment to
prevent public officers from committing breaches of their duties.3 3 Aside
from the inaccuracy of the conclusion, the case is important because Judge
Elliot in a separate concurring opinion disagrees with the reasoning of the
Koerner case. He reasons that the question is simply one of legislative
power, and that the legislature may provide for exemplary damages even
20 Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322; Humphries v. Johnson, 20 Ind. 190; Wabash
Printing Co. v. Crumrine, 123 Ind. 89; Borkenstein v. Schrack, 31 Ind. App. 220;
Skufakiss v. Duray, 85 Ind. App. 426.
80

5 Ind. 322.

31 56 Ind. 284.
32

103 Ind. 55.

Chief Justice Mitchell says that it is certain from the beginning what the consequence of the offense may be and there is therefore no possibility that the penalties
may overlap each other. Quare: Does the certainty keep defendant from being
punished twice? It would seem immaterial.
33
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though the act is also a crime, if it so desires, and that such is not barred
34
by constitutional limitations. In the still later case of State v. Schoonover,
a somewhat similar situation was involved and the court reaches the same
conclusion as reached in State v. Stephens. However, the court goes further
and indorses the reasoning of Judge Elliot, and holds the statute involved
constitutional without any inquiry as to whether the amount allowed by
the legislature as damage was compensatory or punitive in character.
At this stage, therefore, the court seemed to have taken a definite stand
directly contrary to their original position. But this position was not to
remain long, and the last decided case has again left us in a state of confusion. This case was that of State v. Latshaw. 35 The question involved
in that case was the validity of the fraudulent marriages act. This act provided that if a man, subject to a criminal prosecution for seduction or
bastardy entered into a marriage fraudulently to escape punishment -and
then subsequently abandoned her, the wife might sue for a penalty (it was
called a penalty in the act) of not less than a certain sum. The defense
contended that such might result in double punishment. This contention,
however, was disapproved by the court. The significant thing though is
the method used by the court in arriving at this conclusion. The court
examines the nature of the damages stipulated and concludes that they
are remedial in character and not punitive. The court says the sole purpose
was to create a liability for compensatory damages. Or, in other words,
the court goes back to the analysis used in the case of State v. Stephens.
Both State v. Stephens and State v. Schoonover are cited in the opinion,
although the proposition they are cited for is simply that the legislature
may provide for the recovery of damages in a civil action, although the
act may subject the defendant to a criminal prosecution. This proposition
being so broad, adds nothing to the solution of the problem.
Since there is involved in these cases an important constitutional question,
a brief analysis of the problem seems justifiable. The fifth amendment to
the Constitution of the United States provides that no person shall be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense. But this amendment has no bearing
whatsoever upon the problem under discussion for the reason that this
amendment is solely a limitation on the power of the Federal Government.
It has long been established that the amendment places no restrictions on
the exercise of the state power. 36 There is, however, a similar provision
in the "Bill of Rights," of our Indiana constitution.3 7 This provision is a
limitation on the power of the state. It is this provision which the legislation in question purportedly violates. The question then is: Does the
legislature have the power to provide for the allowance of exemplary
damages where the act is also a crime? As we have seen, the Indiana
cases are in confusion. Upon analysis, however, it is submitted that the
legislature should have this power. In the first place, it would seem that
the defense of double jeopardy is premature, for the reason that in none
of the Indiana cases is there any showing that the defendant has actually
been punished criminally. It would appear that there necessarily must be
a first jeopardy before there can be a second, and only when a second is
sought is the constitutional immunity from double punishment threatened
135 Ind. 532.
35 156 Ind. 194.
30 Barron v. City of Baltimore, 7 Pet. (U. S.) 243, 8 L. Ed. 672; U. S. v. Lanya,
260 U. S. 377; McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U. S. 155.
37 Art. 1, Sec. 14.
34
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to be taken away. 38 In the second place, it is very doubtful whether this
provision in the "Bill of Rights" was meant to apply to civil actions at all.
In fact, it seems clear that such a constitutional quaranty was incorporated
solely to prevent a person from being punished twice for the same criminal
offense. And case after case may be found in other jurisdictions where
such an interpretation has been placed in this provision. 39 Even in Indiana,
the cases dealing with somewhat similar questions would seem to indicate
this. For instance, a statute making certain acts criminal and punishable
by fine and imprisonment and also providing for a civil remedy by injunction
was held to not violate the "double jeopardy" provision. 40 If the defendant
violated the injunction might he not be imprisoned twice? So also the
great weight of authority in other jurisdictions on the specific question of
41
It
exemplary damages is contrary to the constitutional rule in Indiana.
is true that if all of these states had the compensation theory of exemplary
damages, the position of the Indiana court could be reconciled. However,
this is not true, as most of them have the same theory "as has been adopted
in Indiana, viz., that of punishment. Again it would seem that if punishment
by way of exemplary damages is similar to punishment by the criminal law,
that in every case where exemplary damages are recovered they necessarily
would have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant
otherwise guaranteed the protection given to a defendant in a criminal case.
In view of all these facts, it seems to the writer that this constitutional
provision is wholly inapplicable when a question of exemplary damages is
involved.
For those, however, who dislike the doctrine there is another provision
in the state constitution which could possibly be invoked. This is the provision in our bill of rights against cruel and unusual punishments. 42 This
limitation on the state's power seems to have been raised in only one case
where the question of exemplary damages was involved. That was the
case of State v. Latshaw discussed above. In this case, though, as has
been previously mentioned, the court decides that the act doesn't provide
for punishment at all, but is simply remedial in nature. However, the
language of the court seems to leave you with the impression that if it did
actually provide for punishment, there might be merit to the argument that
such would be cruel and unusual punishment. Again, however, we have
the same question as is involved in the "double jeopardy" provision. That
is, does this provision apply to punishment in a civil action at all? It would
seem that it would not.
In this connection, it is important to notice that there is also a prohibition
in the Federal Constitution against cruel and unusual punishment. This
provision is contained in the eighth amendment; but inasmuch as this
amendment limits solely the power of the Federal Government, it has no
38 This seems to be the position of our Supreme Court. See Shevlin-Carpenter Co.
v. Minnesota, 218 U. S. 57, 54 L. ed. 930. In this case, the validity of a Minnesota
statute allowing double damages in an action of trespass, .was involved. The tort was
also a crime. Mr. Justice Miller said the question of double jeopardy was premature.
That there must be a first jeopardy before there can be a second, and only when a
second occurs is the constitution violated.
39 Smith v. Bagwell, 19 Fla. 117, 45 Am. Rep. 12; Chiles v. Drake, 2 Metc. (Ky.)
146, 74 Am. Dec. 406; State v. Shevlin-Carpenter Co., 99 Minn. 158, 108 N. W. 935;
Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wisc. 282, 28 Am. Rep. 582; Jockers v. Borgman, 29 Kan.
109, 44 Am. Rep. 625; Stout v. State, 36 Okla. 744, 130 Pac. 553, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.)
884; Corn v. Somerville, 1 Va. Cas. 164, 5 Am. Dec. 514.
40 State v. Roby, 142 Ind. 168.
41 Brown v. Swinford, 44 Wis. 282, 28 Am. Rep. 582. See also 8 R. C. L., Sec. 146.
42 Art. 1, Sec. 16.
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application here. 43 However, it might be possible to bring this in under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. This amendment
provides that no state shall deprive a person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law. In order to invoke this provision, it would
be necessary for the Supreme Court to say that cruel and unusual punishment on the part of a state deprives a person of life or liberty without due
process of law. And apparently the Supreme Court has so extended the
doctrine of due process. 44 Here, however, it seems that due process as
applied to cruel and unusual punishment extends only into the field of
criminal prosecution. Again it might be argued that the due process clause
would also include double jeopardy. The writer, though, has been unable
to find any case in which the doctrine of due process has been so extended
by the Supreme Court. There is one case, however, which by inference
would seem to indicate that this attitude might be taken by our highest
court.4 5

This extention of the doctrine of due process has been made

by a lower Federal court. 40 Due process, as a matter of procedure, requires
notice, 47 an opportunity to be heard,48 an impartial tribunal, 49 and an orderly

course of procedure, 50 and it is more than likely that it will be extended to
include double jeopardy. But even if we assume that it might be so
extended, there still remains the question of what double jeopardy means.
As has been said, it probably would be construed in its usual technical
meaning, that of two criminal punishments.
In conclusion, we may safely say that Indiana has definitely taken the
position that a court is unwarranted in allowing the recovery of exemplaiy
damages where the wrong is also a crime. As to whether the legislature
can provide for their allowance in a civil action seems doubtful, although
as we have seen there seems to be no logical reason why it could not. First
of all, there is the one case which expressly decides that such is unconstitutional. Secondly, the last decided case was very careful to examine the
kind of damages provided for. If the legislature had the power to provide
for exemplary damages, this would be unnecessary. On the other hand,
we have Judge Elliot's separate opinion in the Stephens case, and the
opinion in the Schoonover case. However, in the Stephens case, it was
expressly decided that the legislation didn't provide for exemplary damages
at all, and in the Schoonover case, the same result might have been reached
as a matter of statutory construction..
(e)

Exemplary Damages as a Matter of Right

While there is some confusion in the cases, the better view seems to be
that an injured party has no absolute right to exemplary damages, and it
is error for the court to instruct the jury to give them. 51 The question of
See cases cited in footnote 37.
McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U. S. 155, 35 L. ed. 971; Gulf, etc., Ry. v. United
States, 246 U. S. 58, 62 L. ed. 574.
45 In Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U. S. 57, 54 L. ed. 930, the defense
contended that there was double jeopardy and thus the defendant was deprived of
his life, liberty and property without due process of law. The court, however, held
there was no double jeopardy involved. It did, however, recognize the due process
43
44

question, but reserved its opinion as to whether double jeopardy would violate the
due process clause.
46 Ex parte Ulrich, 42 Fed. 587.
47 Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30, 37 L. ed. 637.
48 Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U. S. 409, 42 L. ed. 218.
49 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 71 L. ed. 749.
50 Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U. S. 86, 67 L. ed. 543.
51 Vol. I, Sedgwick, Damages (9th Ed.), Sec. 387.
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their allowance is one for the jury.52 Indiana follows the view that they
are not a matter of right. 53 In this connection, it would be well to notice
that the elements of aggravation do not have to be pleaded. If it is shown
wanton, or oppressive
by the evidence that the acts were done in an abusive, 54
manner, the jury is justified in allowing their recovery.
VI
Heretofore the discussion has covered only those cases where the actual
tort feasor's liability for exemplary damages was in question. Where it is
sought to allow these against a corporation or principal for the acts of its
servants, some different questions are involved.
(a)

Liability of a Principal

In general, a principal is not liable for exemplary damages when the
wrong is committed by his agent or servant under aggravating circumstances
and while acting in the course of employment. 55 There are circumstances
however, when it is proper to assess this sort of damage in a suit against
the principal. Thus it is generally held that he is so liable if he expressly
authorized the act of the agent or servant, 56 or approved or ratified it after
it was done. 57 So also he has been held to this liability where he has been
negligent in hiring the agent or servant. 58 Or there may be liability when
the principal retains the servant, knowing that he is incompetent and liable
to act in a reckless manner.59 The liability, therefore, if any exists, is due
to actual fault on the part of the principal or master and does not result
simply from the identity of principal and agent as does other damage. The
writer has been unable to find any Indiana case discussing this proposition.
(b)

Liability of Corporations

A majority of the courts apparently have adopted the rule that exemplary
damages are recoverable in a suit against a corporation for injury caused
by the wanton or malicious acts of its servants or agents, even though the
corporation has not ratified or approved the acts, or otherwise been guilty
of actual misconduct.6 0 The old case of Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry. is
usually cited as the leading authority for this proposition. 6 ' On the other
hand, there are a substantial number of cases which do not permit such a
liberal allowance against the corporation. In these jurisdictions, it is usually
held that the corporation is only liable when the agent is one of the head
52
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Indianapolis Bleaching Co. v. McMillan, 64 Ind. App. 268.
54 Indianapolis Bleaching Co. v. McMillan, ibid.
55 Wright v. Glen Falls, etc., Ry. Co., 48 N. Y. S. 1026; Davis v. Hearst, (Cal.)
116 Pac. 530; Craven v. Bloomingdale, 171 N. Y. 439, 64 N. E. 169; Dillingham v.
Russell, 73 Tex. 47, 11 S. W. 139; Mace v. Reed, 89 Wis. 440, 62 N. W. 186; Ristine
v. Blocker, 15 Colo. App. 224, 61 Pac. 486; Mead v. Pollock, 99 I1. App. 151; Patterson
v. Waldman, 20 Ky. L. Rep. 514, 46 S. W. 17; Haines v. Schultz, 50 N. J. L. 481,
14 Atl. 488.
56 See note, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 35, for a splendid collection of the cases.
57 Note, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 35. As to approval by the master, it seems that
mere retention of the servant in his employment is not enough. Dillingham v. Russell,
73 Tex. 47, 11 S. W. 139. But retention, after knowledge is evidence of approval.
Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Anderson, 90 Va. 1, 17 S.E. 757.
58 L. R. A. (N. S.) 35, note.
59 Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia, 71 Conn. 369, 42 Atl. 67; see also note, 28
Am. St. Rep. 876.
60 8 R. C. L., Sec. 141.
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men of the corporation so that it might be said his act was the act of the
corporation; or the act was authorized or ratified; or the corporation was
negligent in employing the agent or servant knowing that he was incompetent. 62 This last mentioned position is untenable, says the Maine court
in the Goddard case. Involved there was a question of a railroad's liability
to exemplary damages for a malicious insult on a passenger by one of its
servants. The court says, "We confess that it seems to us that there is
no class of cases where the doctrine of exemplary damages can be more
beneficially applied than to railroad corporations, and it might as well not
be applied to them at all as to limit its application to cases where the servant
is directly or impliedly commanded by the corporation to maltreat and
insult a passenger, or to cases where such an act is directly or impliedly
ratified; for no such cases will occur. A corporation is an imaginery being.
It has no mind, but the mind of its servants; it has no voice but the voice
of its servants; it has no hands with which to act but the hands of its servants.
All its schemes of mischief, as well as schemes of public enterprise, are conceived by human minds and executed by human hands; and these minds
and hands are servants' minds and hands. All attempts, therefore, to distinguish between the guilt of the servant and the guilt of the corporation,
or the malice of the servant and the malice of the corporation, is sheer nonsense and only tends to confuse the mind and confound the judgment."
The court in a later part of the same opinion answers the objection that it
is a terrible hardship to assess these against an innocent corporation by
pointing out that it can protect itself by the employment of competent agents
and servants. Indiana has always followed the prevailing rule, and it has
not been concerned at all with the additional circumstances which are a
prerequisite under the minority rule. 63 In fact, our courts have pronounced
as silly and metaphysical the argument that a corporation can't act maliciously
and has pointed out, that as a practical matter, there is a human intelligence
and volition which controls the affairs of a corporation just like those of an
individual. 64 It would seem that the Indiana and majority rule is not subject
to any very serious objection. There is sound policy behind the rule because
corporations will unquestionably be more careful in selecting their agents
and servants in view of the fact that juries have a habit of rendering large
verdicts against them. Under this rule, however, we have a peculiar situation
in Indiana. Suppose a conductor of a railroad commits a willful assault
and battery on a passenger. Under our law, no exemplary damages can
be recovered against the servant because he is subject to a criminal prosecution and may suffer double punishment. However, they may be assessed
against the corporation because it is not subject to a criminal prosecution for
the agent's assault upon the passenger. 65 Since the liability of the corporation
is due solely to the fact that the actual wrongdoer is its agent, doesn't it
seem illogical that it may pay greater damages than the actual tort feasor?
Such, however, is the obvious result under our decisions. In one Indiana
case, there is language to the effect that a corporation is liable for exemplary
damages whenever the agent may be. 66 In view of the above, it is submitted that such a statement is technically inaccurate.
62 Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101, 37 L. ed. 97 (usually cited

as being the leading case for this position); Great W. Ry. v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305;

Magagnos v. Brooklyn Heights Ry., 112 N. Y. S. 637; Peterson v. Middlesex & S. T.
Co., 71 N. J. L. 296, 59 Atl. 456.
63 Jeffersonville Ry. Co. v. Rogers, 38 Ind. 116; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Davis,
44 Ind. App. 375; Indianapolis Bleaching Co. v. McMillan, 64 Ind. App. 268:
64 Jeffersonville Ry. Co. v. Rogers, 38 Ind. 116.
65 Indianapolis Bleaching Co. v. McMillan, 64 Ind. App. 268.
66 State v. Stevens, 103 Ind. 55.
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From this brief sketch of the subject, it is apparent that there is a
great deal of confusion in the decided cases. From a logical standpoint the
whole doctrine seems to lack support. The chief weakness of the doctrine
is that it is contrary to the established theory of damages that of compensation to the injured person. However, from a legal standpoint the doctrine
is well fixed in practically all of the states. While many courts have followed
the doctrine more because of precedent than anything else, it nevertheless
appears to be a doctrine so well established that it will not readily be done
away with. In fact, it is so well established that some courts refuse altogether to discuss it from a logical standpoint, but decide the case on precedent alone.0 7 On the other hand there are opinions in which the doctrine has
been ridiculed. But even in these cases, the courts have still followed the
rule of precedent in the end. Our Indiana courts have several times disagreed
with the whole doctrine; and possibly this attitude has been one reason for
our unusual rule where the wrong involved is also a crime.6 8
As a practical matter, however, the allowance of this type of damage
often times may not be so serious. Take for instance the unlimited power
of the jury in assessing damages for injuries to the feelings and other
losses not strictly pecuniary in character. The Indiana court has time and
again allowed recovery for these; and since they are often indefinite, the
jury has unlimited power in assessing them. 9 A Wisconsin case will
illustrate that exemplary damages may not always be unjust. 70

The case

was tried in the lower court three times; at two of the trials the jury was
instructed that exemplary damages could be allowed. At the other trial,
they were instructed no exemplary damages could be allowed, but that they
might allow an amount for wounded feelings. The significant thing is that
the jury returned the same verdict in all three cases. It is just human nature
that juries do such things.
It must be admitted that there are strong arguments either for or against
the doctrine. In fact, a wealth of material is available for either position.
But in spite of all arguments, the doctrine has survived and, in conclusion,
we must concede that the doctrine will continue to remain a fixed part of
our substantive law.
CLAUSES EXCLUDING AVIATION INJURY AND DEATH AS
RISKS NOT ASSUMED IN LIFE OR ACCIDENT
INSURANCE POLICY
BYRON K. ELLIOTT*

The risk of death or injury from aeronautics, like the risk incident to
underwater navigation, was for many years too indeterminable and costly
to be included in the average life, health or accident insurance policy at the
regular premiums. Therefore, many insurance companies sought to exclude
67

Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. (U. S.) 371.

68 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Bierhaus, 8 Lid. App. 563.

69 Moyer v. Gordon, 113 Ind. 282. This case involved an action for forcible entry.
The court held that no exemplary damages could be recovered, but that the jury might
take into consideration the bodily and mental suffering, injury to pride and social
position and the shame and humilitiation at having his wife and family turned out in
street. See also Nossaman v. Rickert, 18 Ind. 350.
70 Bass v. Railway Co., 36 Wis. 450, 39 Wis. 636, 42 Wis. 654.
* General Solicitor, John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, Boston, Mass.

